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Abstract: This paper traces the adoption process by top management of a performance 
evaluation system initiated by the financial controllers at the Research and Development 
site of leading multinational company. The research puts forward that the success of the 
change efforts depends on the nature of relationships among the organizational members 
involved in the process. Because performance measurement and evaluation systems have 
notoriety for being controversial, the notion of trust, operationalized through strong ties, 
emerged as pivotal to reduce uncertainty during the change process and facilitate the 
introduction of the performance evaluation system. The research also points out that the 
structural position of financial controllers within organizational networks is an important 
aspect in the success/failure of implementing such problematic control systems. Also, the 
social network analysis used in this paper has proved to be a useful methodology for 
studying the relational patterns that occurred during the change process.  
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This article traces the adoption2 process by top management of a performance measurement 
and evaluation system initiated by the financial controllers at the Research and 
Development site of a leading multinational company. The aim of introducing the new 
system was to penetrate operational layers and gain more visibility and control over the 
software development cycle (e.g. Tuomela, 2005). Such endeavors threaten operational 
members, as they dissipate local islands of power and open up a new realm for financial 
controllers in operational units. These processes are often characterized as controversial3 
(Vaivio, 2004) whereby local agents mobilize their power to jeopardize the implementation 
of such initiatives (Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Kasurinen, 2002). Conflict may arise 
between financial controllers and operational members/units and may become exacerbated 
when operational members perceive financial controllers in their narrow and traditional 
role, isolated from organizational realities. In these instances, the lack of an anchor point – 
personal ties – in operational units may affect the ability to introduce performance 
measurement and evaluation systems. Notwithstanding, as the role of financial controllers 
becomes deeper rooted in operational areas, they are more likely to develop strong 
relationships with their operational counterparts, allowing trust to emerge and facilitating 
change. 
In an early study of seven firms in the electronics sector, Innes and Mitchell (1990) 
suggested that when management accountants work closely, as part of a team with other 
                                                                                                                                                    
1 Current/permanent address: IUT de NICE, Département GEA, 41 Boulevard Napoleón III, 06206 NICE 
CEDEX 3, FRANCE. 
2  Perera et al. (2003) argue that the diffusion of innovations (e.g. transfer pricing) occurs in a two-
step process. The implementation process goes through a primary stage, top management adoption, 
followed by a secondary stage, the acceptance by organizational actors. Although the primary stage 
of “mandated” changes by top management seems trivial in nature (see Perera et al., 2003), the 
present study argues that the primary stage is rather tedious and unpredictable for “emergent” and 
“controversial” processes (see Burns and Vaivio, 2001). Following Perera et al. (2003) terminology, 
the research undertaken here is an account of the primary stage or “top management adoption” of 
the implementation process. 
3 According to Sulaiman and Mitchell (2005, p. 433-434) the introduction of new management 
accounting techniques, such as a performance measurement and evaluation system, can be seen as 
problematic. 
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technical experts and line managers, the latter recognized and appreciated the management 
accountants’ contribution. The management accountants’ new role resulted in an improved 
relationship between management accountants and others (Innes and Mitchell 1990, p. 15). 
The authors also observed that in one of the electronic firms (Firm E), once dominated by 
engineers, management accountants became more constructive and actively participated in 
the introduction of one new technique to replace another. As a consequence, the structural 
position of management accountants moved away from being purely isolated to becoming 
more centrally located in the organizational network. Although not explicitly mentioned in 
their study, the increasing interactions resulted in a closer relationship between 
management accountants and technical experts that allowed trust to develop. In this case, 
management accountants became proactive and facilitated the introduction of a new 
performance evaluation technique. Quite different observations were found by Scapens and 
Roberts (1993) during the introduction of a control system. These authors emphasized that 
the complex web of social processes involved in the process of change inadvertently 
created conditions that defeated the content of the change. They found that mistrust 
between production unit managers and financial controllers created conditions for 
resistance to change and resulted in a contest of power that inevitably led to failure. They 
pointed out that the project team – financial controllers – lacked a detailed knowledge of 
the company’s operations and the network of contacts within operating units. The limited 
amount of interactions between operational managers and financial controllers created 
propitious ground for a hostile environment to develop and to compromise the 
implementation of the control system. 
In a story of the successfull introduction of performance measurement and evaluation 
systems, Cobb et al. (1995) described the process of establishing greater accountability for 
divisional managers of a multinational bank. They found that continuing dialogue between 
managers and financial controllers and much greater informal contact between them were 
important features of the change process. During the process, the nature of the financial 
controllers’ activity evolved. At the beginning of the study, there was little interaction 
between the financial controllers and the managers of other areas of the division. However, 
the financial controllers’ activity gradually developed from a pure financial activity to a 
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mix of financial and managerial tasks. Managers increasingly valued the contribution of the 
financial controllers. As a result, the structural position of the latter became more central 
within organizational networks and consequently the “boundary of management accounting 
expanded into the operational realm” (Cobb et al., 1995, p. 171). 
In an account of failure to introduce a performance measurement and evaluation system, 
Kasurinen (2002) described how a project to introduce a balanced scorecard actually 
resulted in the implementation of a cockpit type of scorecard. The system implemented was 
not that intended because of the resistance to change between organizational members and 
more particularly the mistrust between engineers and managers. Kasurinen (2002) noted 
that “increasing visibility to divisional management and the fears that a ‘divisionally 
designed’ system would not meet the local needs of the case unit had an influence on the 
case project, … the ‘engineering culture’ tended to weaken the role of strategies and 
strengthen the role of diagnostic measurement in the case organization” (Kasurinen, 2002, 
p. 337). 
In an empirical study, Emsley (2005) related the nature of management accountants’ 
activities and the likelihood of success of the introduction of management accounting 
systems, such as performance measurement and evaluation systems. He found that 
management accountants who work with operational members have greater success in 
introducing performance measurement and evaluation systems. The author noted that 
management accountants, with a business unit orientation, spend lengthy periods of time 
within operational units and have a greater mutual understanding of and empathy towards 
the information needs of operational managers. Through a high level of interactions, they 
learn from each other and develop closer relationships, thereby reducing the perceived 
uncertainty of business unit managers about the benefits of any innovations. As such, 
management accountants with a business unit orientation develop a trusted relationship 
with business unit managers, thus reducing resistance to the introduction process and 
facilitating the implementation of more radical accounting systems (Emsley, 2005, p. 163). 
The above studies suggest that the introduction of performance measurement and 
evaluation systems is an idiosyncratic process in which a myriad of interactions emerges 
among organizational actors, mainly financial controllers and others. The social context – 
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i.e. the nature of interpersonal ties – plays an important role in the introduction of 
performance measurement and evaluation systems. The present study claims that the 
success of financial controllers in implementing performance measurement and evaluation 
systems depends on the nature of the relationships among the organizational actors 
involved in the change process and that financial controllers’ reputation for conservatism is, 
to some extent, related to their position within operational networks. For instance, a 
controversial process may be perceived as less controversial when financial controllers 
develop and maintain strong interdependencies as their role becomes more constructive. 
Consequently, resistance to change can be reduced and performance measurement and 
evaluation systems are more likely to be introduced. Trust is a facilitating interface in such 
processes. On the other hand, when financial controllers are involved in a more 
traditionally oriented role – i.e. when they interact mainly among themselves in dense 
networks of strong ties (e.g. the finance division) – they remain isolated from the rest of the 
organization, resulting in a climate of mistrust with other organizational members/units. 
Therefore, the implementation of a performance measurement and evaluation system would 
more likely lead to failure or suboptimal solutions for financial controllers because the 
system implemented would clearly be inferior to the financial controllers´ expectation. 
This research also involves the concept of networks, which has been scarcely debated in the 
literature on the implementation of performance measurement and evaluation systems. 
However, it has recently gained importance in the literature on management accounting and 
inter-firm relations. The study draws on certain concepts developed at the inter-firm level 
and then relates them to the intra-firm level. Networks4 have arisen from the need to gain 
access to resources in addition to those provided internally to compete more successfully in 
a highly turbulent and competitive environment (Borgatti, 2003; Mouritsen et al., 2006). 
The basic feature of network coordination is interaction, in which units in the networks 
                                                 
4 Some of the concerns addressed at the inter-firm level also apply at the firm level. Coordination 
forms at the firm level can be thought of as a continuum, with hierarchies at one end of the 
spectrum and networks at the other. Networks within organizations share some of the same 
development characteristics as inter-firm networks. Networks have arisen out of the inadequacy of 
rigid hierarchical structures to adapt to the uncertainties of the changing environment. A purely 
bureaucratic structure can hinder creativity, whereas a more flexible structure in which trust and 
informality of relationships is encouraged aids in adapting to and facilitating change. 
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interactively seek a suitable solution (Håkansson and Lind, 2004). Network coordination is 
more efficient when activities are dissimilar but closely complementary and need to be 
performed by two or more companies (Richardson, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Network coordination may involve the sharing of joint decision-making in areas such as 
strategic planning and new product/process development, and may entail joint investments 
in relation-specific assets. These relationships may encompass a great deal of uncertainty 
and risk for both parties owing to difficulties in gaining cooperation with partners with 
different objectives (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). 
One stream of research in management accounting has been the study of forms of control in 
organization networks. Appropriate governance structures include traditional management 
control systems (Ouchi, 1979, 1980), but also the increasing importance of trust as a new 
control mechanism (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). However, the issue of 
trust remains a much-debated question. For some, trust is considered as a substitute for 
formal control mechanisms, while for others it is complementary. Tomkins (2001) and Seal 
et al. (2004) claim that accounting is beneficial in building trust, while Dekker (2004) and 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) see control mechanisms as detrimental in 
specific uncertain situations and view trust as a substitute for control mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, trust has been shown to decrease the risk of inadequate behavior (Langfield-
Smith and Smith, 2003; Tomkins, 2001), to avoid failure (Das and Teng, 2001; Speklé, 
2001) and to reduce the level of opportunism (Granovetter, 1985; Van der Meer-Kooistra 
and Vosselman, 2000). 
In inter-firms relations, trust develops through strong interdependencies that take time to 
build (Gulati 1995). Strong ties are time-consuming to develop and maintain (Granovetter, 
1973, 1982), so that inter-organizational arrangements can be conceptualized as “loosely 
coupled organizations having a core of strong and weak ties” (Imai and Baba, 1989). Strong 
ties serve as a basis for social control mechanisms and weak ties transmit novel information 
(Rowley et al., 2000). Strong ties involve trust and the exchange of fine-grained 
information between partners. Weak ties are infrequent contacts that, because they are 
episodic, do not necessarily have affective content (Nelson, 1989). However, weak ties can 
reach a large number of people and traverse greater social distances than strong ties because 
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they are more likely to link members of different small groups and provide people with 
access to information and resources beyond those available in their own social circles.5 
Therefore, weak ties propagate ideas, rumors, etc., faster than strong ties because they 
provide a link between cliques that greatly accelerates the penetration of ideas. On the other 
hand, strong ties tend to be concentrated within cliques, provide greater motivation to be of 
assistance and are more likely to be useful when there is insecurity (Granovetter, 1982). 
Therefore, it would be expected that weak and strong ties can play a complementary role. 
On one hand, weak ties, namely acquaintances, could constitute a preferred conduit to 
propagate performance measurement and evaluation systems to distant organizational 
locations when uncertainty is low,6 i.e. when operational members are in favor of 
introducing the system. However, since the implementation of a performance measurement 
and evaluation system may be controversial, it is likely to meet resistance to change. In 
such circumstances, advocates and detractors will mobilize their personal network of strong 
ties to implement or oppose the change. “Trust” can therefore be thought of as a facilitating 
interface during the introduction of problematic systems. Strong ties are more suitable for 
coping with the resulting uncertainty and overcoming resistance to change. 
 
2. Case setting 
 
The study took place in the R&D site of Sygmatech (fictitious name), situated in the 
telecom valley of Southern France. It employed a staff of approximately 1600 mainly 
involved in two activities: developing new software and maintaining existing packages. The 
scope of the project involved the entire Development Function, composed of the Core 1, 
Core 2, Systems Planning and Information Systems development divisions, and also three 
marketing divisions that were closely related to development activities (Product 
                                                 
5 See Granovetter (1973) for a thorough development of this argument. 
6 Lewis and Weigert (1985) noted that when actions are undertaken with complete certainty, there is 
no need or possibility for trust to develop. 
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Specifications, Quality Testing, Product Documentation) and the development divisions of 
two strategic business units7 (see Figure 1). 
 
<Insert figure 1 here> 
 
A long tradition of freedom in terms of controlling8 activities persisted at the R&D site. 
Directors and managers of the development divisions at the R&D site interfered with the 
activities of financial controllers, making business cases look good and giving themselves 
leeway in resource allocation. Budgets were largely used for ceremonial purposes and were 
not integrated into management practices. 
Also, the effect of forthcoming industry deregulation coupled with a lack of financial 
control over R&D activities (i.e. limited visibility of R&D spending) meant that top 
executives were concerned about cost consciousness and business competitiveness. The 
efficiency and effectiveness of R&D activities became a priority, in particular the cost of 
developing new software. In fact, development divisions´ directors at the R&D site were 
unable to give precise cost figures because the information provided by the current system 
was static and vertical by nature9. Therefore, the objective of the Financial Controlling 
Manager (Controller 1) was to implement a performance measurement and evaluation 
                                                 
7 Product Specifications, Quality Testing and Product Documentation divisions worked in the 
upstream and downstream process of new product development. Most employees were development 
engineers and worked closely with development divisions. For simplicity, the three marketing 
divisions were considered as development divisions. 
8 At the French site, financial controllers had a functional orientation with little legitimacy in the 
company. The financial controllers´ main activity was the budgeting process. The R&D site was 
divided into cost centers. Reports were prepared by the financial controllers, on such items as labor, 
software & hardware, travel expenses etc., and sent to the directors of the development divisions 
and to the Vice President of Development who was also General Manager of the French R&D site. 
9 Systems Planning development engineers of the R&D site had recently implemented a system, 
adapted from the New Project Management approach (from the Project Management Institute), to 
manage new product development. One difficulty was that the New Project Management approach 
helped managing new projects in terms of phases (proposal, concept and planning, construction, 
acceptance, transition, etc.) but not in terms of managing the activities of the software development 
cycle process (i.e. requirement analysis, coding, testing, etc.). Moreover, the process activities 
overlapped various NPM phases. 
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system for the software development cycle. Such a process view would give better visibility 
to the process of developing new software. 
The change required significant modification of the current SBC system (Sygmatech 
Budget Control system), a legacy system that was designed in-house. The SBC 
representatives (table 1) were formal representatives from each development divisions of 
the French R&D site. They were responsible for the SBC system and authorized any 
changes to it. 
 
<Insert table 1 here> 
 
They formed a committee that met every six weeks at the SBC representatives meeting. 
The committee had three system administrators (Administrators 1, 2 and 3) who worked 
full time on developing, maintaining and updating the SBC system. SBC representatives 
were responsible for communicating any change in the SBC system within their 
development divisions (see figure 2). 
 
<Insert figure 2 here> 
 
SBC representatives acted as formal communication channels, or boundary-spanning 
individuals, between the SBC system and the development divisions of the French R&D 
site. 
 
2.1. The grounding phase 
 
Controller 1 initiated the primary stage, i.e., “top management adoption” of the 
implementation process by presenting the project to the Cost Study Manager from the 
Systems Planning Development division who had worked at the company for  12 years (see 
table 1). This lateral move, involving another senior manager with good knowledge of the 
company’s political landscape, provided Controller 1 with positive feedback on the project 
content and advice on whom to seek acceptance from: 
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[About the project proposal] “The idea is coherent…there is an actual need for it. I 
recommend that you look for the support of Engineer 1 – a Manager of the Systems 
Planning Development division and Engineer 2, one of Engineer´s 1 subordinates. Both 
participated in implementing the New Project Management project… Don´t go and see 
the Executive Vice President of Development without their consent.” (Cost Study 
Manager in a formal meeting with Controller 1 and the researcher) 
 
The Cost Study Manager also warned Controller 1 of potential threats and obstacles 
involving people’s perceptions of and reactions to the project: 
 
“From the company’s culture, you are running a risk of bumping into a window. It took 
five years to implement the SBC system.” (Cost Study Manager in a formal meeting 
with Controller 1 and the researcher) 
 
The difficulties of the implementation of the SBC system were recalled by several 
Sygmatech´s managers:  
 
“The main reason it took so long to implement the SBC system was due to the laxness of 
the previous Senior Vice President of Development. He used to say “let´s give people 
time to adopt the system…They will end up using it.” (Administrator 1 in a SBC 
representatives meeting) 
 
“Initially, people thought that we wanted to know what they were doing…But when we 
explained to them that it was necessary for resource allocation, and to determine the 
amount of R&D expenses to capitalize to the balance sheet, they started to be more 
responsive.” (Product Management Manager in a feedback and support meeting) 
 
Then, as suggested by the Cost Study Manager, Controller 1 presented the project to 
Engineer 1. Engineer 1 was concerned about the lack of accuracy in project reporting:  
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“Today, we have no visibility in the software development cycle. The reality is that we 
do not know how to measure it although we are all conscious that it is necessary. Top 
management has asked several times what the cost of it was and its contribution to the 
overall business model.” (Engineer 1 in a formal meeting with Engineer 2, Controller 1, 
Controller 2 and the researcher) 
 
Engineer 1 was interested in Controller’s 1 project and together they agreed to prepare a 
joint proposal. A coalition10 (or Project Team) was created comprising Controller 1, 
Engineer 1, Controller 2, Engineer 2 and the researcher. Engineer 1 and Engineer 2 became 
strong allies for Controller 1, Controller 2 and the researcher because they came from a 
development division of the R&D site and had ample experience of the technical aspects of 
the software development cycle. Subsequently, the Project Team prepared a proposal: the 
software development cycle control project. They, then, approached one of the SBC 
administrators (Administrator 2) from the Cost Study Department to learn about the process 
of implementing the new project in the SBC system. The Project Team knew Administrator 
2 well, especially Controller 2 and Engineer 2 (a recently promoted SBC representative), 
because they both worked closely with her on different projects. Administrator 2 
represented an entry point between the Project Team and the SBC representatives. 
 
2.2. Dynamics at the SBC representatives meetings 
 
When the project was presented for the first time to SBC representatives at the SBC 
representatives meeting, the Finance Director was the only director who supported the 
project. Controller 2 presented the project instead of Engineer 2 although Administrator 2 
had warned: 
                                                 
10 Stevenson et al. (1985) defined a coalition as an interacting group of individuals, deliberately 
constructed, independent of the formal structure, lacking its own internal formal structure, and 
consisting of mutually perceived membership that is issue-oriented and focused on a goal or goals 




“At the introduction meeting, as many of you as possible should come, especially 
Engineer 1 and Engineer 2…It is important that Engineer 1 introduces the change to 
the SBC representatives and SBC administrators.” (Administrator 2 in a formal 
meeting with the Project Team) 
 
Engineer 1 and Engineer 2 knew several SBC representatives well. They were the ones who 
had implemented the New Project Management phases in the SBC system. However, 
neither of them could attend the meeting. Controller 2 did not know any of the SBC 
representatives (except Management Accounting SBC representative) and knew he would 
be perceived as an intruder. Financial controllers at the French R&D site knew that they did 
not benefit from a favorable reputation among development divisions. As anticipated by 
Controller 2, his presentation of the proposal triggered differing reactions among SBC 
representatives. Several behavioral and technical issues were raised by SBC representatives 
from Product Management, Core 1, Business Unit 1 and Management Accounting. Cross-
communication developed, tension built up and conflict arose between several SBC 
representatives. Some of the discomfort can be illustrated as follows: 
 
“Such a change will be a nightmare. People find the system already very complicated… 
At Business Unit 1, many employees are contractors. They do not feel concerned about 
filling their time in the SBC system … and when they enter their time, many of them do 
it erroneously.” (Business Unit 1 SBC representative) 
 
“People will cheat on the system.” (Product Management SBC representative). 
 
Another source of concern was the secondary stage of the implementation process, namely 
the acceptance by organizational users. 
 
“Step after step, you want to implement it gradually! I think it will be too difficult to do! 
I don’t think that people will respond to it favorably. It will create a lot of confusion. 
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They are already very confused…Acceptance by the user will be complicated.” 
(Business Unit 1 SBC representative) 
 
At the end of the meeting, the issue remained unsettled. Some SBC representatives were in 
favor of the change, while some others rejected it (Table 2). 
 
<Insert table 2 here> 
 
Controller 2 proposed conducting feedback and support meetings11 and preparing a formal 
communication and implementation plan for the following meeting. Before the second SBC 
representatives meeting, Engineer 1 had convinced the Systems Planning Director, his 
superior, of the suitability of the project. At the second SBC representatives meeting, SBC 
representatives began to realize that the proposal was a serious initiative. 
 
2.3. Project Team - development division diffusion process 
 
At the second SBC representatives meeting, SBC representatives from Core 1, Business 
Unit 2, and Product Management were impatient to see the proposal. The Core 1 SBC 
representative was identified as the first one to be involved in a feedback and support 
                                                 
11 Feedback and support meetings were formal meetings organized by the Project Team with SBC 
representatives. The sessions were conducted on an individual basis to create a space for discussion 
about the proposal. At first, they were a source of discord between Project Team members because 
Controller 1 wanted to include, in the feedback and support meetings, only influential actors from 
all the development divisions to obtain organizational support. He commented: “We should not 
involve all SBC representatives. Core 1 and Product Management SBC representatives could be the 
exception because they have influence within their development division.” He further explained: 
“SBC representatives work on technical aspects; if top management approves the project, they will 
have to execute what we want… We should not be too democratic because there are some people 
that see problems everywhere.” On the other hand, Controller 2, Engineer 2 and the researcher 
thought that if they bypassed the SBC representatives, it could create opposition among SBC 
representatives. 
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meeting, as he was very eager to look at the relevance of the proposal and communicate it 
to his team12: 
 
“I have a team meeting in 2 weeks and if there is to be a change, I would like to explain 
it to my team.” (Core 1 SBC representative in a feedback and support meeting) 
 
The feedback and support meeting with Core 1 SBC representative provided a constructive 
communication channel to discuss and improve the proposal. Two weeks after the feedback 
and support meeting, Core 1 SBC representative commented in an individual meeting with 
Controller 2 and the researcher: 
 
“I wanted to see in which direction the change would go. Now, I see that the change 
makes sense.” (Core 1 SBC representative in a feedback and support meeting) 
 
Similar individual feedback and support meetings were, then, conducted successively with 
SBC representatives from Business Unit 2, Product Management and Quality Testing. 
During the first feedback and support meetings with SBC representatives with Core 1, 
Business Unit 2, Product Management and Quality Testing, there was much give and take 
in order to build a coherent proposal and to reflect the views of all development divisions. 
They took part in the “top management adoption” process. They were managers and team 
leaders with formal authority within their development division and were directly 
connected to their development divisions´ directors. They facilitated the diffusion of the 
proposal to top management. To create a mass of supporters, the Project Team started 
feedback and support meetings with people who showed a positive attitude towards the 
change. The support received from Business Unit 2, Product Management, Quality testing, 
Core 1 strengthened the initiative before the meetings with SBC representatives who 
showed a negative or indifferent attitude towards the project. Business Unit 1, Management 
                                                 
12 Until the feedback and support meetings, the Project Team had agreed not to show or transmit 
any written document to anyone to avoid uncontrolled diffusion of the proposal. The Project Team 
wanted to obtain, first, some organizational support. 
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Accounting, and Core 2 reacted differently as they were invited by Controllers 1 and 2 to 
be participants in a feedback and support meeting. 
In face of the negative attitude of the SBC representatives from Business Unit 1 towards the 
project, Controller 1 intended to present the initiative directly to Business Unit 1 Director, 
bypassing both Business Unit 1 SBC representative and Business Unit 1 Manager. 
However, to Controller’s 1 surprise, Business Unit 1 Director recommended Controller 1 to 
review the proposal directly with Business Unit 1 Manager. Also, Business Unit 1 Manager 
had been warned by her SBC representative about the negative aspects of the initiative. As 
Controllers 1 and 2 invited the manager of Business Unit 1 to a feedback and support 
meeting, she answered ironically:  
 
“Absolutely!! I could write a book about it. I have so many ideas, issues about the SBC 
system.” (Part of an e-mail sent by Business Unit 1 Manager to the researcher in reply 
to an invitation to a feedback and support meeting) 
 
Although the proposal had reached Business Unit 1, the negative rumors had spread among 
Business Unit 1 hierarchical superiors. Therefore, Controllers 1 and 2 were expecting 
conflict in the feedback and support meeting with Business Unit 1 Manager. 
Surprisingly, the Management Accounting SBC representative, who was the last to be 
consulted, did not view the change favorably. Her input was important because she is an 
SBC representative and because she has expertise in determining the amount of R&D 
expenses to capitalize -the new proposal was composed of many development activities, 
many of which could be capitalized to the balance sheet. She overtly disagreed with several 
activities in the new proposal, as they would no longer be capitalizable under IFRS 38. She 
commented to the researcher that she was surprised and did not understand why she had not 




“Her input is important to determine the amount of R&D expenses to capitalize, but 
building a performance measurement and evaluation system is our business.” 
(Controller 1 in a formal meeting with Controller 2 and the researcher) 
 
This situation seemed to create resentment in her, and she looked to mobilize support from 
her hierarchical superior, the Management Accounting Manager. 
Resistance was also shown by the Core 2 SBC representative. During the SBC 
representatives meetings, he always remained isolated and replied with apathy to issues 
related to his division. Controller 1 noted: 
 
“This is what worries me. I have not heard good things about him, neither outside nor 
inside the Core 2 division." (Controller 1 in a formal meeting with Controller 2 and the 
researcher) 
 
The Project Team knew the project would not be implemented without the acceptance of 
Core 2, one of the oldest and largest development divisions. Its director had a lot of 
influence, as he is very close with the Executive Vice President of Development. In fact, 
Core 2 Director and the Executive Vice President of Development worked together before 
their appointment at Sygmatech. As Core 2 Director´s opposition could jeopardize the 
project, Controllers 1 and 2 knew they had to handle the situation with great care if they 
wanted the proposal to be accepted by top management. 
Therefore, although the SBC representatives meeting allowed the Project Team to liaise 
with all development divisions, several SBC representatives were still resisting the change. 
The Project Team knew that it had to receive positive feedback from all SBC 
representatives for the “top management adoption” process to be successful.  
 
2.4. Intra-development division diffusion process 
 
The SBC representatives meetings and the feedback and support meetings provided the 
Project Team with communication channels to transmit the project to all development 
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divisions. For the Project Team, there was an unexpected source of organizational support 
in six13 of the nine development divisions; namely Core 1, Business Unit 2, Quality 
Testing, Product Management, Information Systems, and Customer Support. The six SBC 
representatives from those six development divisions introduced the project to a 
hierarchical superior in their development divisions and obtained organizational support 
from them. For instance, SBC representative from Core 1 proposed introducing the 
proposal himself within his development division: 
 
“If you want, I can present the proposal to the Core 1 Director to see if he has any 
feedback before you present it to the Development Directors’ Meeting. It would be good 
if you had his point of view before the meeting.” (Core 1 SBC representative in a 
meeting with Controller 2 and the researcher) 
 
Similar initiatives were proposed by SBC representatives from Business Unit 2, Product 
Management, Quality Testing, Information Systems and Customer Support who introduced 
the project to their hierarchical superiors, namely their managers or directors, from whom 
they received positive feedback. In those six cases, the Project Team did not make any 
contact with any other development divisions´ employees other than the SBC 
representatives. The Project Team relied on the trust relationship that existed between SBC 
representatives and their hierarchical superiors to obtain organizational support for the 
project. 
In the case of the SBC representatives who were resisting the initiative, namely Business 
Unit 1, Management Accounting and Core 2, the process was more unpredictable. In the 
cases of Business Unit 1 and Management Accounting, the Project Team had to face the 
SBC representatives´ hierarchical superiors and convince them that the change was 
positive, in spite of the negative arguments they had received from their SBC 
representatives. To convince the SBC representatives´ hierarchical superiors, the Project 
                                                 
13 After several SBC representatives meetings, a bandwagon effect was observed, as SBC 
representatives from Information Systems and Customer Support, who were absent from several 
SBC representatives meetings, joined the initiative. 
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Team looked for a Project Team member close to the SBC representatives´ hierarchical 
superior. For instance, in the case of Business Unit 1, as Controllers 1 and 2 were expecting 
a negative reaction from Business Unit 1 Manager, Engineers 1 and 2 conducted the 
feedback and support meeting with her, as they had known her for a long time - over ten 
years. After the feedback and support meeting, Controllers 1 and 2 were surprised that 
Business Unit 1 Manager had not actually shown any strong opposition. In fact, during the 
session, Engineers 1 and 2 carefully reviewed the proposal with her and made necessary 
changes. 
The Management Accounting SBC representative looked for political support and security 
from her hierarchical superior. She explained to her manager (Management Accounting 
Manager) the capitalization issue and expressed her resentment about not having been 
consulted early on the proposal. Consequently, a formal meeting had to be organized 
between financial controllers and management accountants to settle the issue. In the case of 
Core 2, none of the Project Team members knew either Core 2 SBC representative or Core 
2 SBC representative’s hierarchical superior well. Therefore, Controllers 1 and 2 asked the 
Core 2 SBC representative: 
 
“Who would you recommend as the best persons to provide feedback about the 
project?”(Controller 2 in an informal conversation with Core 2 SBC representative)   
 
He put forward the names of two Core 2 team leaders (Team Leaders 1 and 2). After 
several failed attempts to contact them, Controller 1 sent them a provocative e-mail 
message, copying their manager. Part of the message was: 
 
“We have received the feedback from all the other groups. We are just waiting for the 
feedback from Core 2…We need to have it before the end of April because in May we 
are planning to review the proposal with the Executive Vice President of Development. 
It would be really unfortunate if Core 2 was the only division not to give any feedback.” 
(Part of an e-mail addressed by Controller 1 to Core 2 team leaders)  
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In the following days, Team Leaders 1 and 2 responded in a positive way and new 
modifications were added to the proposal. 
Unexpected to the Project Team, many SBC representatives became allies in the process of 
gaining support in higher hierarchical levels of the organization. SBC representatives 
diffused the project from the Project Team to the development divisions and subsequently 
within the development divisions to obtain support for the proposal. SBC representatives 
had made “top management adoption” possible because of their ability to liaise with their 
respective development divisions (see figure 2). They had convinced their hierarchical 
superiors about the viability of the project and had obtained organizational support from 
them. For the SBC representatives who were resisting or indifferent to the proposal, an 
interactive process was used, involving either a search process for trusted relationships in 
order to obtain organizational support (cases of Business Unit 1 and Management 
Accounting) or a provocative e-mail to obtain a positive response to the project (case of 
Core 2). 
 
2.5. Top Management Approval 
 
Finally, Controller 1 and Engineer 1 presented the change to the Executive Vice President 
of Development who approved the initiative. Then, e-mails were sent to each development 
director, explaining the reasons for the change and the persons who had been involved in 
the process. E-mails were sent before the Development Directors’ Meeting so that the 
change could be discussed during the meeting. At the Development Directors´ Meeting, 
Controller 1 presented the proposed change. No development directors argued or 
complained about the proposal, and many of them were in favor. Afterwards, Controller 1 
reported to the researcher that it had been more like an explanatory meeting. Controller 2 
made extensive presentations to development unit managers and their teams. Internal 
communication went well in written form through mass media, the local Sygmatech journal 
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The R&D unit of Sygmatech was considered a suitable setting for this study because of 
difficulties related to the introduction of performance measurement and evaluation systems 
in the R&D environment. In fact, antagonism existed between the engineers and the 
financial controllers at Sygmatech, and this created a propitious environment in which to 
study “the top management adoption” process and resistance to change. Although a case 
study involving a single firm is limited in terms of statistical generalizability, it offers 
opportunities for in-depth observation and analysis of complex research phenomena in a 
way that permits contextual generalizability (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995, cited in Granlund, 
2001). 
The case project began in August 2003, and the active part of the study finished in 
September 2004. Some follow-up visits and phone interviews were made by the researcher 
until March 2005, at which time the system was satisfactorily put in production and reports 
were prepared for the first quarter of 2005. During his stay at Sygmatech, the author spent 
five to seven hours on site each day, and was given an office with wide access to 
information and to the company’s intranet. During the first 3 months, the researcher 
prepared a finance and accounting training course for non-finance managers to inform them 
of the role and activity of the Controlling Department. This allowed the researcher to 
acquire knowledge of the company and provided opportunities to meet with influential 
persons from diverse organizational units. During the empirical phase of the study, the 
researcher was an active member of the Project Team and participated actively in most 
aspects of the project: preparing the project proposal, interviewing, discussing and 
coordinating with different organizational members, attending meetings, communicating 
follow-up information, and participating in feedback and support meetings. The 
involvement was close to that detailed by Eden and Huxham (1996, p. 526): “research 
                                                 
14 Explanations about the dates are provided in the following section (section 3). 
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action results from an involvement by the researcher with members of an organization over 
a matter which is of genuine concern to them and in which there is an intent by the 
organization members to take action based on the intervention. These criticisms of the 
involvement by the researcher are countered by the argument that the involvement with 
practitioners over things which actually matter to them provides a richness of insight which 
cannot be gleaned in any other ways.” Data were collected from multiple sources, mixing 
qualitative and quantitative methods, including observations, semi-structured interviews, 
meetings, documentary analysis and classified data (Denzin, 1978; Scapens, 1990; Yin, 
1984). The aim was to generate a rich source of field data with internal checks on their 
validity. The explanations that were developed were not simply “grounded in the data” in 
the sense of Glaser and Strauss (1967), but were grounded in action (Eden and Huxham, 
1996).  
The overall research process was highly iterative (Miles and Huberman, 1984). As the “top 
management adoption” process was traced through the people involved in it, two questions 
arose: “Are there any relationship patterns among individuals who became involved in the 
process?” and “How can those relationship patterns be described?”, for which the literature 
on management accounting change did not appear to provide satisfactory answers. The 
author then engaged in data collection, attempting to trace the “top management adoption” 
path of the project. The data collection was not influenced by an a priori theory of the 
implementation of performance measurement and evaluation systems. Thus, all pre-
understanding was temporarily suppressed – theories were only considered as they emerged 
and not in advance of the research – to avoid closing off new and alternative ways of 
understanding the data (Eden and Huxham, 1996) and the imposition of an arbitrary 
“analytical framework” on the case (Scapens and Roberts, 1993). Analysis of the data 
started to reveal patterns in the process of diffusing the proposal, which prompted reference 
to the literature to seek concepts that might help to explain these patterns. By going back 
and forth between the data and the literature, a reiterative process took place. Arguments 
concerning the strength of ties seemed to point to a relevant conceptual framework to 
explain the phenomenon under study. The strength of ties was defined according to the 
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literature on social networks, and as several interaction patterns arose maps were created to 




In addition to the qualitative data collected from the intervention, quantitative data were 
collected through questionnaires and directed interviews with all the 35 persons involved in 
the “top management adoption” process. A simple questionnaire (Table 3) was distributed 
to the Executive Vice President of Development (also General Manager of the French R&D 
site), to eight division directors (five development directors, two marketing directors and 
the finance director), ten senior managers, ten team leaders and six employees. 
 
<Insert table 3 here> 
 
 An adjacency matrix (table 4), or sociomatrix was prepared from the responses to Q4 of 
the questionnaire. For each of the 34 other persons, respondents were asked to indicate on a 
scale of 4 (I trust him/her as a friend) to –1 (I prefer to avoid him/her) their response to the 
question “How do you qualify your relation with this person?” (Table 3). 
 
<Insert table 4 here> 
 
The scale  -1 to +4 was used instead of the more common Likert scale that ranges from 1 to 
5 to highlight and reflect the negative feeling -distrust/rejection- that one individual could 
feel for another one.  
Individual responses were entered as rows in a 35×35 sociomatrix, in which rows and 
columns represent individuals and cells represent the “strength of ties” between pairs of 
individuals. For instance, number “3” in cell (1,2) indicates that the Product Management 
SBC representative (row 1) decided to answer “know well” (choice 3 to question 4) Core 1 
SBC representative (column 2). Of the 35 questionnaires, 34 were completed. Respondent 
choices for the missing questionnaire (No. 35) were treated as 0. 
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The “strength of ties” network intends to portray the intensity of the relationship by 
determining the strength of the relationship between individuals involved in the “top 
management adoption” process. On one hand, a weak tie or acquaintance represents a 
relationship in which two organizational members are aware of each other and interact 
occasionally. There are arm’s length relationships with low affective transactional content 
and low emotional closeness. On the other hand, strong ties or friendship ties have affective 
undertones that have developed over time through frequent interactions. They involve trust 
and high emotional content. Intermediate ties are those that are neither strong nor weak. In 
such instances, people interact quite frequently and know each other well. Friendship could 
develop through time and the relationship could become a strong tie or otherwise remain as 
it is. 
The questionnaires were completed at the end of the researcher’s stay in the organization. 
This could have biased the centrality of financial controllers in the “weak ties” network as 
they had recently interacted with many development division people at the French R&D 
site (e.g. SBC representatives). Notwithstanding, it did not seem to affect the “strong ties” 
and “intermediate ties” networks because, even though, the ties were measured at the end of 
the researcher’s stay, the financial controllers still remained isolated in the “strong ties” and 
“intermediate ties” networks –probably because strong ties and even intermediate ties take 
time to develop and maintain. However, the author believes that the involvement of 
financial controllers with operational people during the “top management adoption” process 
has provided an opportunity for them to work further, and in a closer way, with operational 
people to develop new and creative business solutions. In this case, the strengthening of 
control did not seem to lead to distrust but, on the contrary, to enhance trust through the 
interactions between financial controllers and operational people. Regarding other 
organizational actors involved in the project, they already knew each other before the 
project was initiated, as it used mainly existing formal communication channels (i.e. SBC 
representative meetings, Development Directors Meeting, and hierarchical relationships 
within development divisions). For them, the “top management adoption” process in 
implementing a performance measurement and evaluation system and the strengthening of 
control is unlikely to have affected their trust relations. 
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To avoid potential bias and to maintain objectivity, the author excluded himself from the 
social network analysis. The questionnaire was validated by research colleagues and several 
practitioners involved in the project. Questions were of a binary type or on a scale of 4 or 5 
points. To collect the data, the researcher met each of the 35 respondents to deliver the 
questionnaire personally and to explain the objective of the research. Approximately half of 
the questionnaires were returned in person and the other half were returned via the internal 
mail service. Several respondents were contacted either by phone or in person to prompt 
them to fill in and return the questionnaire. The data were entered into the Ucinet IV 
software package, which computes several network measures (Borgatti et al., 2002), and 
several maps were produced using NetDraw. NetDraw allows the researcher to select nodes 
or organizational actors in order to display specific networks. The command “node 
repulsion and equal edge length bias” was used to force the nodes, displayed on the maps, 
to appear at an equal distance from each other to improve the visual aspects of the 
relationships among the individuals (e.g. in certain cases, nodes can be so close to each 
other that it becomes difficult to precise the relational patterns between them). Bidirectional 
arrows (“symmetrical” relations) indicate that persons A and B maintained some relational 
tie between each other. Unidirectional arrows indicate that A chose to answer that she/he 
maintained some relational tie for B, but B chose to answer that she/he does not maintain 
any relational tie with A. The absence of links between actors in the networks mean that 
actors do not have any relational tie between each other. 
 
3.1.1. “Overall” network 
 
Three different maps15 (figures 3a, 3b, 3c) were generated to identify relational patterns 
among the persons involved in the project. Figure 3a depicts the strong ties in the “overall” 
network elaborated from the “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) in which the matrix was 
recoded16 so that choice 4 for Q4 was assigned a value of 1. Choices ranging from –1 to 3 
                                                 
15 Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 appear later in the manuscript (see section 4). 
16 The recoding process transforms or modifies the raw data (through the Transform>Recode 
procedure in Ucinet IV) before submitting them to analysis. For example, we may be only 
 25
were assigned a value of 0. Figure 3b depicts the weak ties in the “overall” network 
elaborated from the “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) in which the matrix was recoded so 
that choices 1 and 2 for Q4 were assigned a value of 1. Choices -1, 3, 4 were assigned a 
value of 0. Figure 3c illustrates the intermediate ties in the “overall” network elaborated 
from “the “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) in which the matrix was recoded so that choice 
3 for Q4 was assigned a value of 1. Choices -1, 1, 2, 4 were assigned a value of 0. 
 
3.1.2. Grounding phase 
 
A map (figure 4) was generated to depict the strong ties in the “grounding phase” network 
and representing the trusted relationships that Controller 1 mobilized in his search for 
organizational support in the early life of the project. The “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) 
was recoded so that choice 4 for Q4 was assigned a value of 1. Choices -1, 1, 2, 3 were 
assigned a value of 0. 
 
3.1.3. Dynamics at the SBC representative meetings 
  
A map (figure 5) was generated to display strong ties or trusted relationships among SBC 
representatives, SBC administrators, Controller 1, Controller 2, Engineer 1 and Engineer 2. 
The map highlights the role of strong ties in the “top management adoption” process among 
SBC representatives and SBC administrators. The “strong ties” network was elaborated 
from the “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) so that choice 4 for Q4 was assigned a value of 
1. Choices ranging from –1 to 3 were assigned a value of 0 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
interested in working with interpersonal trust relationships. Therefore, it turns out that the lower 
rankings (below 3) to question 4 (Q4) “How do you qualify your relation with this person?” do not 
represent strong ties. In such a case, we may decide to recode all ranks lower than 3 to 0 and 
recode all rank 4 as 1 so that only “trust as a friend” (choice 4 to question 4) relationships appear 
on the graphs. The same process applies if we are interested in mapping intermediate ties (choice 3 
to question 4) or weak ties (choices 1 and 2 to question 4). The cut-offs have not been chosen 
arbitrarily but are based on the definition of strong ties and weak ties found in the social network 
literature. 
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3.1.4. Project Team - development division diffusion process 
 
Three maps (figures 6a, 6b, 6c) were generated to highlight relational patterns between the 
Project Team and SBC representatives. Figure 6a depicts the strong ties in the “inter-
development division diffusion” network. It was elaborated from the “strength of ties” 
matrix (table 4) in which the matrix was recoded so that choice 4 for Q4 was assigned a 
value of 1. Choices ranging from –1 to 3 were assigned a value of 0. Figure 6b depicts the 
weak ties in the “inter-development division diffusion” network elaborated from the 
“strength of ties” matrix (table 4) in which the matrix was recoded so that choices 1 and 2 
for Q4 were assigned a value of 1. Choices –1, 3 and 4 were assigned a value of 0. Figure 
6c illustrates the intermediate ties in the “inter-development division diffusion” network 
elaborated from “the “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) in which the matrix was recoded so 
that choice 3 for Q4 was assigned a value of 1. Choices -1, 1, 2, 4 were assigned a value of 
0. 
 
3.1.5. Intra-development division diffusion process 
 
Two maps17 (figures 7a and 7b) were elaborated to display strong and intermediate ties 
between the Project Team, SBC representatives, and SBC representatives´ hierarchical 
superiors for Business Unit 1 and Management Accounting divisions. The maps show (1) 
the position of Controllers 1 and 2 in development divisions and (2) whether specific 
trusted relations existed between Project Team members, SBC representatives and SBC 
representatives´ hierarchical superior in development divisions. To describe such patterns, 
the “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) was recoded so that choices 3 and 4 for Q4 were 
assigned a value of 1. Choices ranging from –1 to 2 were assigned a value of 0. 
 
3.1.6. Top management approval 
                                                 
17 Eight maps were originally developed (see Masquefa 2005 for a full representation) but for 




One map (figure 8) was generated to display trusted relationships between development 
directors and the Executive Vice President of Development. To explore such structural 
patterns, the “strength of ties” matrix (table 4) was recoded so that the choice 4 for Q4 was 
assigned a value of 1. Choices –1 through 3 were assigned a value of 0. 
 
4. Structural analysis 
 
The case description in section 2 illustrated the successful “top management adoption” of a 
new performance measurement and evaluation system originally developed by financial 
controllers. The change process raised issues of support or opposition by various 
organizational members. The following section analyses how different types of 
relationships among individuals facilitated or hindered the “top management adoption” 
process from a social network perspective.  
 
4.1. “Overall” network 
 
The construction of the “overall” network was described in Section 3.1.1. Figures 3a and 3c 
show that employees from a same organizational unit are tied together in networks of 
strong ties. These strong ties are constituted primarily by work boundaries (i.e. figure 3a 
Information Systems at the upper left, Finance at the upper right, Business Unit 1 at the 
lower right, Systems Planning at the lower right, Product Management at the lower left, 
etc.). Figure 3b indicates that weak ties are far more numerous than strong ties. In line with 
the social network literature, weak ties are more easily accessible and easier to develop and 
maintain than stronger ties and are more likely to be found between subgroups. 
 
<Insert figure 3 here> 
 
Figures 3a and 3c show that management accountants (i.e. Management Accounting 
Manager and the Management Accounting SBC representative) and financial controllers 
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(Controller 1 and Controller 2) are quite isolated in the “strong ties” and “intermediate ties” 
networks, while they are more centrally18 located in the “weak ties” network (figure 3b). In 
contrast, Engineer 1 and Engineer 2 are more centrally located in the three networks, 
especially in both the “strong ties” network and the “intermediate ties” network. 
 
4.2. The grounding phase 
 
The strong ties in the “grounding phase” network were represented as outlined in Section 
3.1.2. Figure 4 depicts a network of trusted relationships, operationalized through strong 
ties, among the first people enrolled in the project. 
 
<Insert figure 4 here> 
 
Early in the “top management adoption” process the patterns of interactions between 
Controller 1 and the persons he contacted were not purely random moves (see figure 4). 
Controller 1 first contacted the Cost Study Manager and the pattern of their relation is 
represented by a reciprocal strong tie. The Cost Study Manager benefits from a centrally 
located position in the network. He trusts and he is trusted by all the other actors in the 
“grounding phase” network. The Cost Study Manager also strongly advised Controller 1 to 
meet with Engineers 1 and 2. The meeting between Controller 1, Controller 2 and Engineer 
1 and Engineer 2 resulted in the formation of the Project Team. Moreover, the Project 
Team first contacted Administrator 2 with whom they share strong ties. Accordingly, the 
introduction of the project occurred through a chain of strong ties – trusted relationships – 
before its dissemination to other organizational actors. 
 
4.3. Dynamics at the SBC representatives meeting 
 
                                                 
18 A measure of centrality used in social network analysis is “degree centrality” that counts the 
number of in-ties and out-ties of the nodes to determine which actors are more central than others.  
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An analysis was carried out to determine trusted relationships between the Project Team 
members, the SBC representatives and the SBC administrators, as described in Section 
3.1.3 (figure 5).  
 
<Insert figure 5 here> 
 
Figure 5 highlights the role of Administrator 2 as a cutpoint between the Project Team and 
SBC representatives. That is, if she is taken away from the network, the network would 
then be divided into three independent networks. She used her network of trusted ties to 
inform several of the SBC representatives and SBC administrators, in particular 
Administrator 1, about the Project Team’s proposal, thus reducing possible resistance to the 
project. The Project Team enrolled Administrator 2 because she was an SBC administrator 
and because the Project Team trusted her. The trusted relationships that Administrator 2 
had with the Business Unit 2 SBC representative and Administrator 1 greatly benefitted the 
Project Team. Also, Administrator 1, Administrator 2, the Core 2 SBC representative, the 
Product Management Manager, the Product Management SBC representative, and 
Administrator 3 are all connected in a dense network of strong ties – trusted relationships –, 
and they all reacted positively towards the initiative. 
On the other hand, SBC representatives who were not in favor of the initiative (Business 
Unit 1 SBC representative, Core 2 SBC representative, Management Accounting SBC 
representative) are isolated in the network. Their weaker position in the network reveals 
that they were unlikely to mobilize other SBC representatives to oppose the project. 
Consequently, in the controversial change introduced here, the advocates mobilized their 
network of strong ties to convince other members that the change was a good idea and to 
obtain a critical mass of individuals to overcome detractors. Detractors became more 
isolated and unable to influence other members to oppose the proposal. 
 
4.4. Project Team - development division diffusion process 
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The construction of the “Project Team – development division diffusion” networks was 
described in Section 3.1.4 (figure 6). The abundance of weak ties between the Project Team 
and the SBC representatives (figure 6b), along with the numerous intermediate ties between 
the Project Team and the SBC representatives (figure 6c) and the absence of strong ties 
between the Project Team and the SBC representatives (figure 6a) suggest that the 
performance measurement and evaluation system diffused from the Project Team to the 
distant development divisions (both in terms of physical distance -i.e. different buildings on 
the same R&D site- and social networks) through weak ties and intermediate ties rather 
than strong ties. 
 
<Insert figure 6 here> 
 
These findings are consistent with the bulk of network studies that emphasize the role of 
bridges19 -weak ties- in the propagation of diverse phenomena. For instance, Granovetter 
(1973, p. 1376) notes that: 
 
“Weak ties are more likely to link members of different small groups than are strong 
ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups”. 
 
In this case, SBC representatives served as bridges between the Project Team and the 
development divisions. Consequently, the following proposition can be offered: 
 
P1: The “top management adoption” process in implementing a performance 
measurement and evaluation systems20 will tend to diffuse between 
organizational groups, primarily through weak ties and intermediate ties rather 
than through strong ties. 
 
                                                 
19 In network terminology, a bridge is the only path between differentiated groups within a network. 
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4.5. Intra-development division diffusion process 
 
The construction of the “intra-development division diffusion” network was described in 
Section 3.1.5 (figure 7). This section analyses the relational patterns between: (1) the 
Project Team, (2) the SBC representatives and (3) the SBC representatives´ hierarchical 
superiors for Business Unit 1 and Management Accounting divisions. 
 
<Insert figure 7 here> 
 
Figure 7 suggests that, within Business Unit 1 and Management Accounting, the SBC 
representatives, their hierarchical superiors, and the division’s director are connected by 
strong ties. For instance, Business Unit 1 SBC representative is strongly connected to 
Business Unit 1 Manager who is, herself, strongly connected to Business Unit 1 Director. 
Similar patterns were found in a previous analysis of the other six instances of intra-
development division diffusion (see Masquefa, 2005); that is, the SBC representatives 
presented the project to hierarchical superiors with whom they shared a strong tie to obtain 
organizational support. This finding is consistent with the social network literature. Nelson 
(1989) suggests that people use strong ties for political mobilization and solidarity. 
Therefore, the following proposition can be offered: 
 
P2: The “top management adoption” process in implementing a performance 
measurement and evaluation systems will tend to diffuse within organizational 
units through strong ties. 
 
According to P1 and P2 , the overall “top management adoption” process in implementing a 
performance measurement and evaluation system diffused, in the first place, through weak 
                                                                                                                                                    
20 The following propositions apply for the diffusion of performance evaluation systems that are 
controversial, locally driven (as opposed to centrally driven, see Burns and Vaivio, 2001) and 
implemented in large organizations.   
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and intermediate ties to development divisions and then through strong ties within 
development divisions. Similar findings have been found in the social network literature. 
For instance, Weimann (1980, p.21) suggests that: 
 
“Weak ties provide the 'bridges' over which innovations cross the boundaries of 
social groups…whereas the influence on the decision making is done mainly by the 
strong ties network within each group". 
 
A characteristic that emerges from figure 7 is the network position of Controllers 1 and 2 in 
the operational networks21. Their positions contrast with Engineers 1 and 2. Both financial 
controllers are isolated from the operational affairs of the company. Engineer 1 is, in most 
cases, the cutpoint between the financial controllers and the development units. Only in the 
case of Management Accounting (figure 7b) is the situation reversed, whereby the financial 
controllers occupy a central position. These observations directly reflect the role of the 
financial controllers. The coalition with Engineers 1 and 2 greatly helped the “top 
management adoption” process, especially when SBC representatives were resistant to the 
project. When certain SBC representatives (i.e. Business Unit 1, Management Accounting, 
Core 2) opposed the project, the Project Team members used their intermediate ties with 
SBC representatives to reduce the resistance associated with the change process (i.e. 
Controllers 1 and 2 met with Management Accounting SBC representatives and her 
hierarchical superior, while Engineers 1 and 2 met with Business Unit 1 SBC 
representatives and her hierarchical superior). In both cases, the trust-like relations, 
represented by intermediate ties, seemed to be an important resource. On the other hand, 
when Controller 1 introduced the proposal to Core 2 SBC representatives and his 
hierarchical superiors, his lack of trusted ties in Core 2 development division resulted in 
increasing behavioral uncertainty that could have led to resistance and project failure. In the 
case of resistance to change, weak ties make it more difficult to convince operational staff 
and to overcome their objections. 
                                                 
21 The other six intra-development division diffusion maps show similar patterns to figure 7a; that 
is, Controller 1 and 2 appear isolated. 
 33
On the other hand, when SBC representatives were in favor of the proposal (Core 1, 
Business Unit 2, Customer Support, Information Systems, Quality testing, Product 
management), the feedback and support meetings were highly constructive, and the nature 
of the relationships between the Project Team members and the SBC representatives were 
of secondary importance. Therefore, in the context of the “top management adoption” of a 
controversial performance measurement and evaluation system: 
 
P3: In the absence of resistance to change, weak ties provide more efficient 
conduits and propagate performance measurement and evaluation systems 
faster than strong ties because they provide bridges to distant organizational 
units. 
 
P4: When there is resistance to change, intermediate ties and strong ties are 
more suitable conduits to implement performance measurement and 
evaluation systems because the trust component that has been developed 
through frequent interactions helps to overcome resistance to change. 
 
In light of the above findings and the results found by previous studies in the field of 
management accounting (e.g. Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Cobb et al., 1995; Emsley, 
2005), financial controllers with traditional roles, as in the case of Sygmatech, are likely to 
have more difficulty in obtaining organizational support for implementing performance 
measurement and evaluation systems. Therefore: 
 
 P5: Financial controllers with a “traditional” orientation are less likely to 
obtain organizational support in implementing performance measurement and 
evaluation systems since they remain isolated in organizational networks and 
lack strong ties to operational units. 
 
 
4.6. Top Management approval 
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The construction of the “top management approval” network was described in Section 
3.1.6. The last step in the diffusion process was the acceptance by the Executive Vice 
President of Development. Controller 1 and Engineer 1 attended a meeting with the 
Executive Vice President of Development, during which they explained the raison d’être of 
the project and the people involved in it. They asked him to support the project and 
communicate it through formal communication channels down to the rest of the 
organization. The Executive Vice President of Development agreed to support the initiative 
as: 
 
 “It was congruent with the current needs of the company.” (Executive Vice President 
of Development in a meeting with Controller 1 and Engineer 1) 
 
He also reviewed the people that had participated in the project and was satisfied that a 
consensus had been reached by all the development divisions and the various hierarchical 
levels. The next crucial event was the formal presentation to the development directors at 
the Development Directors’ Meeting. Controller 1 feared opposition from one or more 
directors at the meeting. The aim of meeting was not only to obtain approval from all the 
directors, but also to make them fully responsible for implementing the performance 
measurement and evaluation system within their own development divisions. 
 
<Insert figure 8 here> 
 
The strong ties – trusted relationships – in the “top management approval” network (see 
Figure 8) indicate that most directors at the French R&D site had trusted reciprocal ties to 
the Executive Vice President of Development. This hierarchical network, in which the links 
are organized around the Executive Vice President of Development, suggests that he had 
earned the trust and commitment of most of his subordinates. In an interview with the 
researcher, the Vice President of Development commented on “trust”: 
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“I trust all the persons below me…but from time to time, when they get off the track I 
kick their ass to get them back on the right track…if I did not trust them, they would not 




His approval of and support for the project facilitated the acceptance of the initiative by the 
development directors. No resistance emerged during the Development Directors’ Meeting, 
even from those who could possibly have resisted the change, as they realized that serious, 
influential and trustworthy members of their division had participated actively in the 
process and contributed to the elaboration of the proposal. Therefore, in the primary, 
emergent, bottom-up stage of the process leading to “top management adoption”, 
influential persons from all organizational units were involved and this had a positive effect 




The study undertaken here has traced the primary stage or “top management adoption” 
process in implementing a performance measurement and evaluation system in the R&D 
site of a multinational company. The research contributes in several ways to extant theories 
on implementing performance measurement and evaluation systems.  
One contribution is the extent to which the primary stage, i.e. “top management adoption”, 
is important in implementing performance measurement and evaluation systems. 
Observations from the case study corroborate the two-stage process of implementation; 
namely, “top management adoption” and “acceptance by users”, as suggested by Perera et 
al. (2003). However, Perera et al. (2003) argue that the secondary stage is more crucial in 
explaining the adoption or rejection of an innovation than the primary stage. The study 
presented here (though the second process “acceptation by users” was not the focus of this 
study) suggests that in the case of emergent controversial change, a fragile construction 
takes place. If financial controllers are not aware of the importance of social relationships 
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(e.g. who has strong ties with whom? Who has influence over whom?) during the primary 
stage, the entire implementation process could be undermined (see for example Scapens 
and Roberts, 1993). The primary stage is a complex, emergent, bottom-up and 
unpredictable process that is embedded in a complex web of different tie strength 
relationships. This differs from mandated initiatives that are decided by top management 
and taken for granted. Therefore, the research contends that the primary stage in 
implementing locally driven controversial initiatives by financial controllers in control-
averse cultures requires organizational support before being presented for approval by top 
management. Rogers´ (1995) innovation diffusion process has explanatory power, but fails 
to address such issues as the social relations or political processes involved in gaining 
support from other organizational members. A line of research that has potential in this area 
is actor network theory (ANT) (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987). Rogers´ framework addresses 
the diffusion process in a linear and sequential way, separating the technical content of the 
innovation from its social diffusion. Rogers assumes that the original innovation design 
satisfies the disparate needs of all constituencies. On the contrary, ANT contends that the 
diffusion process is not sequential and that actors and actants are linked together in 
networks that are built and maintained in order to diffuse an innovation. This research is in 
line with ANT; that is, it describes the process of interessement in which the financial 
controllers enrolled diverse organizational members with different interests who finally 
agreed upon a common proposal. The proposal served as a translation device that allowed 
the inscription of all the disparate influences. From the depth of his intervention, the 
researcher argues that the organizational support would have been undermined if the 
proposal had been designed and imposed by financial controllers. The interessement 
process reduced behavioral uncertainties, and resistance to change, through the continuous 
interactions among network members in the search of a common solution. 
This study opens up the complex web of social relationships in the process of securing top 
management approval. Social relationships have been defined in terms of their tie strength; 
namely acquaintance type relations and trust like relationships. Trust has been 
operationalized through strong ties. Strong ties have affective content that develop over 
time through frequent interactions. This research evidences the relationship between trust 
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and resistance to change. As illustrated in table 5a, the study suggests that where 
individuals/units are in favour of the project (e.g. advocates), strong and weak ties both 
provided satisfactory conduits to introduce the performance measurement and evaluation 
system. 
 
<Insert table 5a here> 
 
In this case, however, the lower uncertainty – about the behavioral response of SBC 
representatives towards the project – meant that trust was a less important feature of the 
change process. When individuals/units resisted the introduction of the project (e.g. 
detractors), strong ties (i.e. trusted relationships) reduced the resistance to change and 
helped in the resolution of the conflict. Weak ties were not satisfactory conduits in these 
situations, as they created more uncertainty. Detractors mobilized members in their own 
organizations (their hierarchical superiors) and escalated the conflict, which could have 
ultimately led to project failure. This view is consistent with one of the actors (Controller 1) 
who commented: 
 
“We should go and see people we know… a new person (e.g. a controller) with a new 
initiative creates too much novelty.” (Controller 1 in a formal meeting with Controller 2 
and the researcher) 
 
Another contribution of the study is the evidence it provides about the relationship between 
the position of financial controllers and their ability to implement performance 
measurement and evaluation systems. These findings are consistent with Emsley (2005) 
and suggest that a relationship may exist between the involvement of financial controllers 
and the likelihood of success in implementing performance measurement and evaluation 
systems. The traditional orientation of financial controllers (e.g. focusing on monitoring 
expenditure against budget) may hinder the introduction of system changes, while a more 
“modern” orientation, in which financial controllers are closer to operational people and are 
more involved in decision making, could be more effective in overcoming resistance to 
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change (see also Sangster, 1996). However, in R&D environments, financial controllers, 
and accountants in general, have a rather constrained role primarily because of the lack of 
communication between financial controllers and engineers and their focus on control 
rather than planning. In such circumstances, and as observed at the R&D site of Sygmatech, 
financial controllers need to adapt and learn new roles (e.g breaking down psychological 
barriers and reducing the level of behavioral uncertainty of operational staff) in order to 
develop trusted relationships. Nixon (1998) provides an example of very proactive 
accounting in a R&D environment in which the traditional role of the financial controller 
evolved through the life of an R&D project to become more collaborative with other 
organizational actors. The financial component of the system served to integrate the 
disparate perspectives and to provide a channel of communication to ensure collaboration 
among the project participants and to coordinate progress. Accounting techniques (e.g. cost 
accounting, strategic cost management, target costing, life-cycle costing, customer 
profitability, competitor analysis, investment appraisal) can help financial controllers to 
support development activities in a very proactive way, to integrate disparate organizational 
members perspectives and to facilitate communication and collaboration among the many 
participants. 
Consequently, as table 5b suggests, the position of financial controllers within 
organizational networks has important implications for the success or failure of the 
introduction of performance measurement and evaluation systems. 
 
<Insert table 5b here> 
 
Therefore, controversial changes, such as the introduction of performance measurement and 
evaluation systems, may have a relatively high degree of success when financial controllers 
develop strong ties with operational members/units (Cobb et al., 1995; Innes and Mitchell, 
1990, Nixon, 1998). Controversial change is more likely to be rejected if accountants are 
isolated from operational members/units (Kasurinen, 2002; Scapens and Roberts, 1993). 
Strong ties are the best conduits when resistance to change threatens the success of the 
proposal. On the other hand, introducing non-controversial accounting systems may be 
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faster through weak ties as they provide bridges, and therefore shorter routes, to other 
organizational units. These arguments relate to the literature on “accounting for trust” and 
“trust for accounting” (see Busco et al., 2006). Although the change process in this study 
does not encompass a revolutionary one, as reported in Busco et al. (2006), it nevertheless 
shares some common insights. In the absence of a performance measurement culture at the 
R&D site of Sygmatech, there were signs of distrust towards accounting and control. 
Performance measurement was not embedded within the trusted rationales of development 
divisions, and financial controllers were marginalized in terms of the social networks. 
When the proposal for change was first introduced, different levels of ontological insecurity 
were experienced by the individuals with the development divisions. The coalition of 
financial controllers and engineers reduced the level of behavioral uncertainty as the 
engineers had developed stronger ties –trust– with the development divisions. Feelings of 
trust played a pivotal role in obtaining support from the development divisions, and were 
all the more relevant when behavioral uncertainty was high. The initiative undertaken by 
the financial controllers represented an initial step in the process of becoming closer to the 
development divisions in terms of social networks. The increasing amount of interactions 
between financial controllers and the development divisions reduced the level of behavioral 
uncertainty. In the long term, this may result in the development divisions developing a 
trust for accounting, and that accounting could become accepted as a trusted rationale. 
Finally, the social network perspective can contribute to the field of management 
accounting and control. Social relationships, operationalized here through social network 
analysis, complement existing frameworks. Although scarcely used in accounting, the 
social network approach provides a framework for describing and exploring social 
phenomena, and for representing and analyzing information on communication; thereby 
opening up new possibilities for enriching our current concepts of accounting in its 
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Diffusion Process: (1) Coalition formation between Controllers 1 & 2 and Engineers 1 & 
2. (2) Diffusion between the Project Team and the development divisions through SBC 
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Note: For simplicity, relational ties between organizational units were omitted. The purpose of the 
figure is to illustrate the distinct groups and the relationships between them. The figure also points 
out schematically the general steps of the performance evaluation system diffusion process. 
Figure 2. Schematical illustration of the diffusion process 
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Figures 3b. Weak ties in the “overall” network
Figures 3a. Strong ties in the “overall” network
























































Figure 5. Dynamics at the SBC representatives meeting
Note: Product Mgt Manager has been included in the analysis as he often replaces the Product Mgt SBC 
representative. He also participated in the SBC system design and implementation. Quality Testing SBC 
representative has been omitted from figure 5 as he assisted at only one SBC representatives meeting 
during the researcher’s intervention and played a marginal role in the implementation process. 
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Figure 6a. Strong ties in the “Project Team-development division 
diffusion process” network 
Figure 6c. Intermediate ties in the “Project Team-development division 
diffusion process” network 
Figure 6b. Weak ties in the “Project Team-development division 





Figure 7b. Intermediate ties and strong ties in the “intra-development 
division diffusion” network. Example of Management Accounting 
Figure 7a. Strong ties and intermediate ties in the “intra-development 































Figure 8. Strong ties in the “top management approval” network 
 53
Table 1. Individuals involved in the introduction of the project (at the time of the study) 
 




Controller 1 - Finance 
Controller 2 - Finance 
Engineer 1 - Systems Planning    
Engineer 2 - Systems Planning 
Administrator 1 - Information Systems 
Administrator 2 - Systems Planning 
Administrator 3 - Information Systems 
Product Mgt SBC   
Product Mgt Manager 
Mgt Accounting SBC    
Information Systems SBC    
Business Unit 1 SBC    
Core 1 SBC    
Core 2 SBC    
Business Unit 2 SBC    
Cost Study Manager - Systems Planning 
Core 2 Manager 
Core 2 Team Leader 1 
Core 2 Team Leader 2    
Quality Testing Team Leader 
Quality Testing Manager 
Business Unit 1 Manager      
Information System Team Leader    
Information System Manager    
Mgt Accounting Manager    
Customer Support Manager    
Systems Planning Director    
Finance Director    
Executive Vice President    
Business Unit 2 Director    
Core 1 Director 
Core 2 Director 
Business Unit 1 Director   
Information System Director    
















Contacted by Controller 1 
Not contacted 
Contacted by SBC 
Contacted by SBC 
Contacted by Project Team 
Contacted by Team leader 
Contacted by SBC 
Contacted by SBC 
Contacted by SBC 
Contacted by SBC 
Contacted by Project Team 
Contacted by Project Team 
Contacted by Controllers 
Contacted by Project Team 
Contacted by SBC 





Senior Manager (n-2) 
Employee (n-4) 
Senior manager (n-2) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Senior manager (n-2) 
Employee (n-4) 
Senior manager (n-2) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Senior manager (n-2) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Employee (n-4) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Senior Manager (n-2) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Manager (n-2) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Team leader (n-3) 
Manager (n-2) 
Manager (n-2) 

















































*The Executive Vice President of Development was a pioneer in the creation of Sygmatech in 1987. 
He had held the position of Senior Vice President of Development and General Manager of the 
French R&D for about ten years (until 1998). He therefore recruited many top managers involved in 
the project. He left the French R&D site in 1998 as he was promoted Executive Vice President of 
Information Technology and Chief Information Officer (CIO) in one of Sygmatech parent 
company. He was appointed back as Executive Vice President of Development and General 
Manager of the French R&D site in 2004.  
                                                 
22 The highest hierarchical rank is expressed here as n (i.e. the Executive Vice President of 
Development). Development directors have the next highest hierarchical rank (i.e. n-1). 
Hierarchical ranks for managers are expressed as (n-2), and respectively for team leaders (n-3) and 
employees (n-4).    
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Table 2. Evolution of individual/units´ behavioral reactions during 











Administrator 1 Favorable Favorable Favorable 
Administrator 2 Favorable Favorable Favorable 
Administrator 3 Favorable Favorable Favorable 
Core 1 Strong advocate  Strong advocate Strong advocate 
Product Management Strong advocate  Strong advocate Strong advocate 
Business Unit 2 Strong advocate Strong advocate Strong advocate 
Quality Testing Indifferent Delay – positive  Accept 
Information Systems Indifferent Delay – positive Accept 
Customer Support Indifferent Delay – positive Accept 
Core 2 Indifferent Delay – negative Accept 
Business Unit 1 Reject Resign Resign 






























Table 3. Questionnaire used to measure the strength of ties 
 
Q1 Do you have any relation with this person? (1=Yes; 0=No) 
Q2 How long have you known this person? (Number of months) 
Q3 The communication between you and this person is rather: (1=rarely (once a month); 
2=little (several times a month); 3=some (several times a week); 4=a lot (once a day); 
5=very much (several times a day)) 
Q4 How would you qualify your relation with this person? (-1=prefer to avoid; 0=do not 
know; 1=associate name with face; 2=acquaintance; 3=know well; 4=trust as a friend) 
Q5 The communication between you and this person is rather: (1=technical; 2=decision 







































Table 4. “Strength of ties” matrix (Q4) 
 
 
  1                   Product Mgt SBC   0  3  3  2  3  1  2  2  3  2  3  2  2  2  0  3  0  0  2 -1  0  4  3  3  4  0  3  0  3  0  3  2  0  4  0 
  2                        Core 1 SBC   3  0  0  0  2  1  2  2  1  0  2  1  1  2  0  0  1  0  3  2  1  3  3  3  2  3  0  1  3  0  3  0  1  3  1 
  3                    Core 2 Manager   2  0  0  4  3  0  0  2  2  2  2  2  2  0  3  2  3  2  3  2  2  3  2  0  0  0  3  3  2  2  2  3  4  2  3 
  4              Core 2 Team Leader 1   1  0  4  0  1  0  0  0  3  0  0  1  0  0  2  2  2  2  2  3  2  3  1  1  1  4  2  4  1  1  2  2  4  2  4 
  5       Quality Testing Team Leader   4  0  4  2  0  3  2  1  2  1  0  3  0  0  2  0  0  1  1  4  1  4  1  1  1  0  2  3  4  0  3  2  3  4  2 
  6           Business Unit 1 Manager   0  0  0  0  2  0  4  0  1  0  0  2  0  0  3  2  4  4  1  0  4  4  4  4  0  0  3  1  4  3  2  0  0  0  1 
  7               Business Unit 2 SBC   2  2  0  0  2  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  4  0  0  0  2  2  4  0  0  3  0  3  0  3  0  0  3  0 
  8                      Controller 2   2  2  2  0  2  0  2  0  0  3  3  2  2  3  3  3  0  0  0  2  0  2  2  4  0  0  2  0  2  2  2  0  2  2  3 
  9        Information System Manager   3  0  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  2  2  2  2  0  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  2  0  3  3  2  3  2  0  2  0  2  2  2 
 10                      Controller 1   2  0  2  0  2  0  0  4  2  0  3  3  3  3  2  3  2  2  2  0  2  2  1  2  0  0  3  2  2  2  2  2  1  2  2 
 11                Cost Study Manager   2  2  2  2  0  0  2  3  2  3  0  0  2  2  3  3  2  3  3  0  3  3  0  3  0  0  3  2  3  2  2  2  2  3  2 
 12           Quality Testing Manager   2  0  3  2  4  3  2  2  3  4  2  0  2  0  4  3  4  3  3  2  3  4  1  2  2  0  3  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  3 
 13            Mgt Accounting Manager   2  2  2  0  1  0  0  2  2  4  3  2  0  4  2  4  2  2  2  0  2  3  0  2  0  0  2  2  2  2 -1  1  2  2  2 
 14                Mgt Accounting SBC   2  2  0  0  0  0  0  3  0  3  2  0  3  0  0  3  2  0  0  0  0  0  2  2  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 15         Systems Planning Director   1  0  3  1  1  2  1  2  1  3  4  2  2  0  0  3  4  2  2  0  3  4  1  2  0  0  4  4  3  2  1  3  1  1  2 
 16                  Finance Director   1  0  3  2  1  1  1  3  2  3  3  2  3  3  3  0  3  2  2  1  2  2  0  0  0  0  1  3  2  2  2  3  2  3  2 
 17          Executive Vice President   0  0  3  3  0  2  0  1  2  3  3  3  3  0  4  4  0  3  4  2  4  3  0  0  0  0  3  4  2  3  2  3  2  3  4 
 18          Business Unit 2 Director   0  0  3  1  1  2  4  0  1  2  4  2  2  0  2  4  4  0  3  0  4  4  2  2  0  0  3  2  3  2  2  2  1  4  4 
 19                   Core 1 Director   1  3  3  2  0  1  1  0  0  2  3  1  0  0  3  4  4  2  0  0  4  2  1  0  0  0  4  3  4  1  2  3  2  3  2 
 20                        Core 2 SBC   2  0  2  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  2  1  2  0  0  0  1  0  0  2  1  2  0  1 
 21          Business Unit 1 Director   1  0  3  2  0  3  1  0  3  2  2  2  2  0  2  2  3  2  2  0  0  3  3  0  0  0  2  2  3  2  2  1  2  2  2 
 22               Product Mgt Manager   4  4  3  3  4  3  0  2  0  2  3  3  2  0  3  3  3  2  3  2  3  0  3  3  0  0  3  2  3  3  3  3  3  4  2 
 23               Business Unit 1 SBC   0  3  2  1  1  3  2  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  2  1  1  2  3  2  3  4  0  3  0  0  2  0  2  2  2  1  2  0  1 
 24                   Administrator 2   3  3  0  0  2  3  4  4  0  2  4  1  0  2  2  0  0  0  0  3  0  3  3  0  0  2  2  0  4  2  4  0  0  2  0 
 25    Information System Team Leader   3  2  1  1  2  0  0  0  4  0  2  2  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  2  1  1  1  2  0  4  1  3  1  1  2  2  2  2  2 
 26            Information System SBC   2  1  0  4  0  0  0  1  3  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  3  0  0  2  1  0  2  0  0  1  1 
 27                        Engineer 1   2  0  2  2  1  2  2  1  2  2  3  2  1  0  4  2  2  2  2  0  3  2  1  2  0  0  0  1  4  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 28       Information System Director   3  0  4  4  1  0  0  0  4  3  3  3  1  0  4  4  4  2  2 -1  3  3  0  0  3  3  3  0  3  1  3  1  4  4  2 
 29                        Engineer 2   3  2  0  0  3  3  3  2  0  2  3  2  2  0  3  2  0  2  3  0  2  3  3  3  0  0  3  2  0  0  3  0  0  3  0 
 30          Customer Support Manager   1  0  2  2  0  3  0  1  0  2  2  3  1  0  2  3  3  3  2  0  3  4  3  2  0  0  2  2  2  0  3  3  2  2  0 
 31                   Administrator 1   3  2  2  4  3  2  4  1  4  2  4  1  2  0  2  4  3  3  3  2  3  4  3  4  2  2  2  3  3  3  0  0  4  4  2 
 32 Product Mgt/Cust Support Director   0  0  3  0  2  0  0  0  0  1  1  3  0  0  4  3  3  2  2  0  2  3  0  0  0  0  1  2  0  3  1  0  0  0 -1 
 33              Core 2 Team Leader 2   1  0  4  4  3  0  0  1  2  2  3  2  2  0  2  2  3  2  3  3  3  3  2  0  1  0  3  4  2  2  4  2  0  3  3 
 34                   Administrator 3   3  2  2  2  2  0  2  2  3  2  3  2  2  0  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  4  0  2  2  2  3  3  3  0  4  0  2  0 -1 























Table 5a. Relationship between the strength of ties of the Project Team and the individuals/units 
behavior during the project implementation 
 
 Individuals/Units: 
          Advocate                          Detractor 
Project Team having 
weak ties Participatory  
Conflict/Escalation of 
Conflict 
Project Team having 
strong ties Participatory Reduce/solve conflict 
 
 
Table 5b. Relationship between financial controllers having different tie strength and the likelyhood 
of success/failure in the implementation of performance measurement and evaluation systems 
 
Type of Change Likelihood of Success 
 
            Weak Ties                              Strong Ties 
Controversial 
Change Relatively Low Relatively High 
Non-controversial 
Change 
Relatively High / Fast 
Spreading 
Relatively High / Low 
Spreading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
